Subchapter 2.3 Different ways of defining meanings
2.3.1 Real and nominal definition
Based on Aristotelian inside of Nick Reamer book stated that definition is to be found in the Posterior Analytics, in this period it deals with the explanation of the structure of scientific knowledge. It has two different interpretations. Those are “what the object is” and “what its name means”. A sort of summation of the essence or inherent nature of a thing called as real definition. For instance thunder, it is not a description of the meaning of the word thunder, but expresses thunder’s essential nature. The other example is that Sholat. In English it called as pray. But it is not the real pray that the meaning is “Doa”, but it is expresses the essential of the Sholat itself, because Sholat is not only pray but it also has several activity that should be done in order.
On the other hand, a description the meaning of the word which denotes this thing called as nominal definition. Bloomfield add that we can define the meaning of a speech-form accurately when the meaning with some matter that it should have scientific knowledge. But Bloomfield’s also something that is still ambiguous, controversial and debatable especially when it is dealing with abstract nouns and lack of scientific definition. For the example deals with feeling, for instance like, angry, hate, love and etc.
The first reason to reject Bloomfield theory is that words like unicorn, time machine and light sabre lack any denotation in the real world but it has a meaning. The second reason to reject Bloomfield theory is most of the vocabulary of a language has only a small amount of overlap with terms of the sort which interest empirical science: most of the vocabulary consists of words for a huge variety of objects, processes, relations and states which have no simple analogue in the scientific picture of reality (think of reportage, postpone, ready). Another reason to reject Bloomfield is in the case of terms like salt, if based on scientific definition we should say that it is NaCl, but in fact we do not want to say that the scientific definition. Because people use and understand the word salt even without specialized scientific knowledge. Linguistic semantics aims to define the meaning(s) of a word, not the underlying essence of the object it refers to. It is thus concerned with nominal, not real definition.
Two different functions which a nominal definition may fulfil: fixing the meaning of a word so that there can be no ambiguity about its denotation, and bringing about an understanding of the meaning of a word in someone who does not already understand it, typically in order to enable the word to be correctly used. Let us call the first type of definition extensional definition, and the second type cognitive definition.

2.3.2 Definition by ostension
Ostension: A means of definition which consists simply of pointing to the referent of the word whose meaning is to be defined. Ostensive definition: the meaning of a word has been defined by indicating the object to which it refers. In other words, it specifies the meaning of an expression by pointing to examples of things to which the expression applies (e.g., green is the color of grass, limes, lily pads, and emeralds).  But in fact this definitional method would seem to give rise too many ambiguities to be feasible. The only way to overcome the problems of ostensive definition would seem to be to use language itself as the medium in which definitions can be phrased: only this way, apparently, can we get the level of definitional precision we need.
2.3.3 Definition by synonymy
Synonymy: The situation where two expressions or words have the same meaning. The problem with this strategy is that it is usually possible to challenge the identity between the definiens (the metalanguage word proposed as the definition; Latin ‘defining’) and the definiendum (the object language word for which a definition is required; Latin ‘needing to be defined’). (E.g. begin, start, commence, initiate and others.) The problem that could appear with this theory is that the learner could not choose the appropriate words in the context. It is happened because based on the literary meaning it has same but the usage are different. So it needs the sense of the language to choose the appropriate words as the correct usage. The way to overcome the problems of synonymy definition would seem to be used the context of the situation.
2.3.4 Definition by context or typical exemplar
Defining a word by describing the context in which its referent typically context: occurs (e.g. defining glass with ‘what you usually drink water out of’) the definition identifies the event of scratching by placing it in relation to another event, being itchy, whose meaning is assumed to be already known, and which is taken as a typical context for the definiendum.
Definition by typical exemplar: Defining a word by specifying a typical example (e.g. specifying ‘robin’ for bird) the definition is a list of typical examples or instances of the definiendum.
This theory require the understanding the words that would be used in the context. It also need a cleanliness or specify the words such as specifying ‘robin’ for bird
2.3.5 Definition by genus and differentia
They may often be workable as cognitive definitional strategies, but they are unlikely to be successful as extensional definitions. Definition by genus and differentia (GD definition) means that defining a word by specifying the broader class (the genus) to which the definiendum belongs, and then showing the distinguishing feature of the definiendum (the differentia) which distinguishes it from the other members of this broader class. There are many problem cases, however, where GD definition may be either ineffective or, simply, impossible. GD definition presupposes a system of categories or general according to which definienda can be classed: defining man as ‘rational animal’ presupposes that the addressee already knows the meanings of those two terms. But there is not a large number of genera and differentiae to work with: for many words, the relevant genus will not be familiar to the definition’s addressee, and hence GD definition won’t be an effective strategy for a cognitive definition.

1.6 Breaking the circle
To provide satisfactory explanation of the notion of meaning is currently unanimously hard to find. Researchers in the field of semantics, in many ways, found that there must be limitations in which they could not afford to discuss. However, they believe that the current state of difficulty is approachable in the same way other scientific works revealed that Mendel initial work ended up with modern notion of DNA. In that belief, they try to break the notion of meaning through four perspective definitions. To shed more light of this notion, empirical investigations can be started by provisionally characterize the definitional circles through ordinary language and followed by questions derived through each perspective/circle.

Meanings as referents/denotations
In this definitional circle, the role of referent or denotation should be treated as the main component of the meaning of a linguistic expression. The theory suggests that metalanguage explanations of meaning should be seen as names of the referents of the object language term. In other word, for instance, ‘the students should be in the boarding at the moment’. As it is understood through its referent, the word ‘boarding’ can be varied in meaning to everyone. But, in particular, students of STKIP Al Hikmah could understand that boarding means ma’had (boarding school). In other sense, it can be understood as boarding pass if it occurs at airport, or somewhat else. It succeeds because the referents/denotations identify the non-linguistic world. In other hand, however, an objection can come that way once it has nothing to do with the world projected representation.
The identification in this way may be successful but it causes to a very fragmented picture of the nature of language. The example of this can be seen in the above example of different referent to picture word ‘boarding’. Also, it may come to less clear picture when it comes to lexical categories as the referents. Such as grammatical words and other non-discrete referential words might be greater problems. Another problem is that a single referent may have a variety of different expressions such as the word ‘market’ at which people can take it as ‘place to sell’ or just ‘place to buy’. They are identical in denotations way, though it is concrete referents, it may be completely different.

Meanings as concepts/mental representations
Under this theory, the names of the concepts would be associated with the object language term. Nick Riemer in his book, in purposes, undertakes concepts as a way of talking about the basic constituents of thoughts. More specifically, it would take primitive concept level which cannot be broken to smaller constituent parts, neither not to distinguish the primitive to non-primitive one. It lies on mental live which we usually use to recognize objects in the world themselves. For instance, when we attribute characterizing word to figure someone out, tolerance to Ota. Meaning that, we attribute Ota with certain properties which define together the concepts of it, like patience, generosity, respect, and so on.
The interesting facts of this view are that it firstly answers to the intuition that language is intimately connected with the rest of our mental live (p.29). Therefore, the most of our ideas can be enveloped in most precise form the more we can share our mental concepts to the words use with others. To understand this, for example, the words ‘wooden chair’ can be a way of externalizing our thought of how ‘chair’ is made of ‘wood’. The second, it is often taken to explain compositionality and relations between meaning. Owing the example ‘wooden chair’, it can be seen as built up on two elements, wooden (made of wood) and chair. As each is individually changed then it might express definitely different concept to the meaning as whole. For instance, we change it to ‘steel chair’ or ‘ceramic chair’. Of course, it changes the meaning moreover to its associating concept under the concept of ‘wood’ or ‘steel’, likewise ‘wood’ may draw ‘warm’; ‘traditional end’; and so forth while ‘steel’ may have ‘cold’; ‘modern end’; and so on.
Since concept favored by linguists has the form of symbolic mental representation, the manipulation of mental symbols during communication is unavoidable. It then leads us to understand that when contents of mental events are expressed or recorded in mind, the translation of it in words of natural language follows readily (p.30).
As the previous challenge to the perspective, this definitional circle must also be perceived cautiously. First, some words may seem more naturally compatible than others with interpretation of their meanings as concepts. For instance, the conceptual words like monarchy, scenery, or hate can be readily accepted but not, at least less clear, for words like he, you, or ouch! Second, like father like son, concept is as much the same as meaning itself that cannot be seen or otherwise identified unambiguously. A concept can be open to a variety of interpretations thus it creates bias whether this is justifiable scientifically. Third, though an expression’s meaning can be partly identified with the concepts, there must be more to it than that. In understanding this, for example, if we say ‘Miftakhul Ulum is an outstanding student and an exceptional writer’. To make the much interpretation lessen, when it comes to misunderstanding view to ‘Miftakhul Ulum’ concept of real-person, it may not be true even though I mistakenly believe that ‘Miftakhul Ulum’ is on the contrary just as ‘usual student’. 

Meanings as brain states
When it comes to meaning, brain states must come as most plausible word after all. Understanding or intending a certain meaning, how the neurons in the brain work at particular configuration is best understood by brain states. However, due to our rudimentary state of understanding of how brain works, it is unidentifiable that brain a physical matter could be opposite of, or synonymous with the meanings of words. For that argument, we cannot identify the properties of brain state as well as the meaning itself. Do they share similar properties that can be justified for this circle purpose? To sum it up, any attempt to identify something intentional like language with something non-intentional like brain state will never be successful.
Since it is almost impossible to explain meaning tool in our brain, invoking concept of levels of explanation or levels of description is needed. This will help us better understand in ordinary language of what is going on with the intentional and non-intentional things we discuss. How meanings is understood by this circle is illustrated in the example of playing chess in computer. As if we put computer as a non-intentional thing likewise brain work in such a way, we can better explain the ‘How’ in certain level of explanation. In the lower level of explanation, understand what the different steps of running program in computer algorithmically would be the way to understand the intentional move even before the decision taken in advance. In the level of implementation, it is to understand the specific ways in which an algorithm implemented in multiple ways in an actual physical machine. This will be obviously different from an old magnetic tape to modern type ones, a spinning hard disk for instance. As a result, it is inevitable that meaning is part of explanation of utterances. Understanding this will be important for understanding of language, but not at the expense of meaning.
   
Meanings and use
To simply introduce this, I quote what Skinner (1957: 5) explained ‘what happens when a man speaks or respond to a speech is clearly a human behavior’. In the words of Bloomfield (1993: 139), the only meaning a linguistic form has is ‘the situation in which the speaker utters it and the response which it calls forth in the hearer’. For example, the word ‘sorry’ or ‘thank’ in English, it can be understood that although we do not do external analysis of the situation as the hearer would treat it as apology or gratitude. Thus, he/she might treat and response it accordingly. Moreover, if a full theory to explain how language is used is achieved, then the goal of semantics will be fulfilled.
The objection against the use theory is mind-boggling variety of the situations in which linguistics forms may be used. If the meaning of a linguistic form is the situation of the speaker’s utterance and the hearer’s response, there will be very few words to point a certain meaning like the given word ‘sorry’. This theory ignores the compositionality of language due to the constant changing of situation in which meaning is built up out of combination to suit the communication need.

1.7 Meaning and explanation
Meaning is described as a shorthand way of talking about a whole variety of separate phenomena in which are all individually important in our talk about language, especially on the intentional level of explanation, but which do not necessarily correspond to any single entity that will be revealed by careful empirical study. In any case, meaning in English might have no precise role in a full understanding in other languages. So, meaning is many different things, none of which should be ruled out as irrelevant to the eventual explanation of language.
The causal account of language behavior suggests a possible role for the notion of meaning in semantics. To explain word use, we use the words we used because due to the meanings they have. To go beyond that, a word’s meaning may include many different explanatory properties and necessitate considerations of referents and concept and situations of use. As result, to assert a meaning by single category is counter-productive since many factors should be working all together to make it understandable. However, a certain condition will be much more likely to be requiring one circle to get better understanding of meaning. For instance, if we say ‘ma’had is holy jail’, the meanings as concept can better explain this instead of as referents/denotations. The use theory might be able to give closer look to what it seems to be there in the words ‘holy jail’ but giving this to the concept is best over all.

4.4. Gricean maxims and the cooperative principle
Grice claimed that implicatures like in the following examples claimed as the result of the infringement of certain principles or ‘maxims’ that conversation should be rational exchange and governed by the Cooperative Principle:
a. A: Have you read Sebald?
B: I haven’t read the back of the cereal packet.
b. A: Do you know how to get to rue du Pasteur Wagner?
B: I’ve got map in my back.
c. A: Do you like anchovies?
B: Does a hippo like mud?
The Cooperative Principle is essentially the principle that the participants in conversation work together in order to manage their speech exchange.
By the Cooperative Principle, Grice distinguished four general maxims, itemized below, which he claimed that speakers mainly observe, and expect others observe, in conversation:
a. The Maxim of quality
Try to make your contribution one that is true, specifically:
(i) Do not say what you believe to be false.
(ii) Do not say for which you lack adequate evidence.
b. The maxim of quantity
(i) Make your contribution as informative as is required for the current purposes of the exchange.
(ii) Do not make your contribution more informative than is required.
c. The maxim of relevance
Make your contribution relevant.
d. The maxim of manner
Avoid obscurity
Avoid ambiguity
Be brief
Be orderly
(Grice 1989: 26-27)
He also added that all maxims don’t have equal important, as such maxim of manner. Some people will not really much pay attention to the polite manner. Furthermore, people frequently disobey the role of maxim. They prefer to talk exchange to obtain the primary purpose of conversation (regardless the governed maxim). Grice acknowledge, however, that maxims will need to be modified in order to take account of these other purposes.
4.4.1. Infringing the maxims
Grice consider four ways in which a speaker may fail to observe maxim.
a. A maxim may be violated, as for example when one deliberately sets out to mislead (in violation of first maxim of Quality), to confuse or to bore (violation of various Manner maxims).
b. One may simply opt out of the Cooperative Principle, as such by saying “I can’t say more, my lips are sealed”, in order to avoid divulging a secret.
c. One may be faced by clash, for example if it was impossible to informativity maxim without infringing the evidentiary one. (see the following conversation)
A: Where does C live?
B: Somewhere in the south Africa.
d. Maxim-flouting is where the speaker exploits an obvious infringement of one of the maxims in order to generate an implicature. Flouting is the origin of the implicated meaning conveyed in the following conversation:
a) A: Have you read Sebald?
B: I haven’t read the back of the cereal packet.
b) A: Do you know how to get to rue du Pasteur Wagner?
B: I’ve got map in my back.
c) A: Do you like anchovies?
B: Does a hippo like mud?
In all those sentences, the maxim of Relevance is obviously flouted to varying degree.
On the assumption that speaker is able to fulfill the maxim and to do so without violating another maxim, is not opting out and is not trying to mislead, the hearer is faced with a minor problem: how can his saying what he did say be reconciled with the Cooperative Principle.
(Grice 1989: 30)
4.4.2. Questions about implicatures
Based on Grice, hearer will obtain the meaning of utterance of speaker through rational process of inference in general assumption. For scholar sympathetic to the Gricen approach, this is theoretically significant discovery about the nature of meaning in general. Three observations are relevant.
1. The whole conversations can often proceed without any implicatures of the sort Grice discusses.
2. Not all language occurs in the context of cooperative talk exchange. As such we often make assertions for which we lack evidence, which we know not to be true, and which, in fact, we do not even expect to be understood.
3. The analysis always depends on it being possible to say that an implicature is clearly being conveyed and more less what this implicature is. But how realistic is this? Sometimes it is entirely unclear whether the speaker is implying anything beyond what they are saying. On how it is not the case if the hearer will proceed infringement.

4.5. Are the maxims universal?
This is important to know whether maxim of Grice theory is accepted in conversation except English. Even though, it has importance as other language or not. Keenan questioned in that theory by saying that we can readily imagine situations even in our own society which do not observe the first maxim of Quality. As the hearers are not make contributions as informative as is required for current purposes of the exchange. In the fact that there are many situations where it would be indiscreet, impolite or unethical to be informative. As such, the situations of professional confidence like that involving teacher who teach the anxiety students whether they are low capability. Sometimes the teacher need to be discreet to be more appropriate to appreciate them. This will disobey the govern of the theory. By mean, the theory is not accepted in some people. In the other hand, as Javanese culture also will reject the cooperative principle. The one who are offered something, most of time will say “no thank” but the intended meaning they are saying “thank you so much (they are accepted)”. It proves that the maxims cannot be accepted in all languages or cultures. As Keenan argue that the Gricean Maxims must not be seen as universal principles governing the entire range of human conversational behavior. 

It is happened in the daily activity of Mahasantri of Al Hikmah Teacher institute. It is called as slips. It is caused by their language that can’t connect with their mind. In simply, they know what their intended meaning or what they want to say, but unfortunately they have wrong production or pronunciation.
I have discussed with two Mahasantri in informal situation. They told me everything, then I also told them something, but when I stated something to them. I said, “My experience is good, isn’t it?” then, one of them suddenly said “Mine is better than you.” From that example we actually realized that his intended meaning is “Mine is better than yours,” but it probably their language is not connected with the mind that they want to produce, but although they spoke like that, we (the partner) still understand to what their intended meaning is.
When I tries to speak with the second Mahasantri, he also did the same thing with the first Mahasantri. So to solve this problem, I suggest that the one who usually did this wrong slips, directly gets the treatment at that time. The treatment could be the grammatical error of the structure.